Analysing the Delimitation Bill 2026: A Missed Opportunity for Constitutional Reform

Introduction

From a word unbeknownst to all to being the most controversial constitutional topic in 2026, the delimitation of electoral constituencies took centre stage in the Indian Parliament when the Union Government proposed the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-First) Amendment Bill 2026 (‘Amendment Bill’). This Amendment Bill attempted to offer solutions to two major constitutional problems plaguing Indian federalism: first, it increased the number of seats in the House of the People to 850 seats from the earlier 550 seats; and second, it provided to reserve one-third of these seats for women. Both reforms had been overdue for several decades, with calls for increased gender representation and proportional representation of people within the legislative bodies. Along with the Amendment Bill, the Union Government proposed both the Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 and the Delimitation Bill, 2026. This blog seeks to examine the latter, i.e., the Delimitation Bill, 2026 (‘2026 Bill’) in-depth.

In a separate piece, I have argued for the delimitation process to be made transparent and consultative, proposing multiple reforms within the delimitation legislation and the Census Act. These reforms range from ensuring a timeline for conducting the census process, declaring the delimitation method adopted by the Delimitation Commission, and maintaining robust consultation during the delimitation process. This blog post aims to build on these criticisms and highlight other concerning provisions introduced in the 2026 Bill. The first part focuses on Section 3(1) of the 2026 Bill, specifically with reference to the power of the Union Government to constitute the Delimitation Commission from time-to-time. The second part emphasises Section 3(4), critically analysing the entrustment of the power of delimitation to the Election Commission. The blog concludes with the optimism that these changes will be incorporated into the new legislation.

Retaining the Arbitrary Power to Constitute the Delimitation Commission

Section 3 of the 2026 Bill has been amended to provide the Central Government with the power to: (i) form the Delimitation Commission (‘DC’) from time-to-time; and (ii) specify its term of existence. This sees a change from the earlier Delimitation Act, 2002 (‘2002 Act’), which provided the Central Government to singularly constitute a DC after the commencement of the Act. The changes can be simply described as follows:

2002 Act

2026 Bill

Section 3: As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the Central Government shall constitute a Commission to be called the Delimitation Commission, which shall consist of three members as follows.

Section 3(1): The Central Government may, from time to time, by notification, constitute a Commission to be called the Delimitation Commission. Section 3(3): The Central Government may, by notification, specify the term of the Commission. Provided that the Central Government may, on the request of the Commission, extend the term of the Commission by such further period as it may consider necessary.

This change is undertaken against the backdrop of Section 4 of the Amendment Bill proposing the amendment of Article 82 of the Constitution. Article 82 mandates the allocation of seats subsequent to the conduct of a census. The Amendment Bill seeks to delink the allocation of seats from the census process. The introduction of Section 3(1) and 3(3) allows the Central Government to arbitrarily: (a) constitute DCs at a time convenient to them; (b) decide the term of the DCs. Prima facie, this does not seem to be problematic, considering the Central Government under the 2002 Act constituted two different DCs at varied timings. The first under the chairmanship of Justice Kuldip Singh to undertake delimitation of Union and State constituencies; and second, under the chairmanship of Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai to delimit constituencies within Jammu and Kashmir. Since the legislative wording of Section 3 of the 2002 Act did not permit the Government to constitute two DCs, it relied on enacting a government order passed in 2020. Moreover, it was convenient to constitute another DC in 2020, considering the erstwhile one was formed two decades earlier.

I argue that such a position to constitute a DC provides the Central Government with the arbitrary power to cherry-pick the constituencies requiring delimitation, directly influencing both the delimitation process and electoral results. Firstly, it is upon the whims and fancies of the Government to constitute a DC, which they might do at a time convenient to their political interests. Such an argument is not merely a theoretical possibility but a practical concern, as was seen in the case of K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India. In this case, the petitioners were from Andhra Pradesh and were claiming parity with the State of Jammu and Kashmir (‘J&K’). The Union Government had constituted the DC and delimited the seats in the State of J&K, but had not done so for the State of Andhra Pradesh. This was concerning since the reorganisation act for J&K was passed in 2019, way after Andhra Pradesh’s reorganisation legislation that came into effect in 2014. The Government had first not constituted a DC for delimiting seats in Andhra Pradesh for the longest time, and second, when it did constitute a DC for delimiting seats, it only did it for J&K. This was claimed to be unlawful by the petitioners, who argued that there was a legitimate expectation that parity within States vis-à-vis delimitation would be maintained.

I argue that the Supreme Court (‘Court’), rather than curtailing the unlawful action of the Government, paved the way for an easier exercise of arbitrary power to selectively constitute the DC. The Court impressed on the legislative difference between the J&K and Andhra Pradesh reorganisation legislations, with the latter being “subject to the provisions contained in Article 170 of the Constitution”. This conditionality made the Andhra Pradesh legislation subject to Article 170, which mandated delimitation solely after the conduct of a census. While this argument might be foundational to the Court’s legal reasoning, I argue that it rather appreciates other extraneous factors that play a central role. For instance, the Court was apprehensive about curtailing and restricting the Government’s power in light of administrative inconveniences that might arise. Moreover, the Court expressed this by stating that: “Permitting delimitation in some States while denying it to others in comparable circumstances would breed inequality. This could open the door to a spate of litigation, thereby unsettling the finality and uniformity that the Constitution seeks to preserve in matters of electoral readjustment.” 

Citing the example of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland, the Court was conclusive that since these States were expressly excluded from the scope of delimitation by way of the 2021 Notification, they could justifiably question the legitimacy and fairness of such selective implementation. Hence, the Court pre-empted such a possible spate of litigation and allowed the Government to arbitrarily comprise DCs for individual States based on its discretion. The Court’s judgement can thus be colloquially simplified to mean – ‘We understand that the State has acted arbitrarily, but since they have done it several times over the years, there can be legitimate cases that can be filed against them. Thus, we allow them to continue to act in this manner merely to prevent this justified litigation.’ Herein, the Court failed to acknowledge the presence of already existing justified litigation being entertained by another bench in the case of the Delimitation Demand Committee for the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and Nagaland in North v. Union of India. In this case, the Court acknowledged the illegality and ordered the Government three months to carry out the delimitation exercise in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, and Manipur.

Secondly, this power allows the Government the discretion not to constitute a DC at all. Since the Amendment Bill sought to delink the mandate of conducting delimitation after the publication of census figures, it is solely up to the Government to decide the initiation of the delimitation process, accompanied by the constitution of the DC. Moreover, the 2026 Bill eliminates Section 10A of the 2002 Act, which provided the Government to defer delimitation based on the existence of a situation in which the unity and integrity of India is threatened, or there is a serious threat to the peace and public order. With the strengthening of the power of the Government to comprise or disband DCs, such imperative deferral power might be unnecessary.

Lastly, along with this, it provides the Government with the power to sufficiently influence the composition of the DC, i.e., to exercise unchecked hiring and firing. The insertion of Section 3(3) allows the Government to decide the specific term of the DC and appropriately extend or limit it. Being a guarantor institution, it is imperative that the DC is adequately safeguarded by the political executive. Unfortunately, Section 3(3) conditions the existence of the DC into the sole hands of the political executive, who could not only choose members closely associated with the Government but also eliminate those that seek to not serve political interests. Hence, by retaining and accentuating the discretionary power of the Central Government to constitute the DC, the 2026 Bill favours executive aggrandisement rather than electoral fairness

Empowering the Election Commission as the Delimitation Commission

The 2026 Bill inserts Section 3(4) of the Bill that empowers the Election Commission (‘ECI’) to act as the DC for the purpose of delimiting constituencies in the J&K falling under the occupation of Pakistan. Considering the special status of the State of J&K, it might be argued that the ECI would be a better fit to undertake delimitation. However, I seek to argue that despite these circumstances, the DC is an effective body to undertake delimitation and must accordingly be empowered to do so.

With qualms about the independence of the ECI as raised in the case of Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, it becomes imperative to question the legitimacy of the ECI to conduct the constitutionally mandated delimitation process. A DC comprises a majority of members of the ECI with the mere addition of a chairperson. The Delimitation Bill seeks to do away with the requirement of a possible independent member of the DC, i.e., the retired Supreme Court judge. While Dam and others have empirically showcased that judges receiving such post-retirement benefits might not be the most independent in their approach, the 2026 Bill seeks to eliminate that façade of independence.

Since ECI is tasked with conducting delimitation, the inherent safeguards placed within the Delimitation Act might not automatically become available to the ECI, since they are solely applicable to the DC. For instance, Associate Members, who ensure that delimitation remains a politically inclusive process, won’t be present to assist the ECI. Additionally, under Section 5(5), the DC has the power to rely on the assistance of the Registrar-General and Census Commissioner, the Surveyor General of India, officers of the Central Government or State Government, experts in geographical information systems, or persons whose expertise and knowledge are considered necessary by the DC.

Hence, while several problems exist with the Amendment Bill, the 2026 Bill further seeks to accentuate the Union Government’s control over the delimitation process. By not mandatorily linking the delimitation process to the conduct of a census, the Amendment Bill attempted to use the asymmetries of Indian federalism as a pawn in the game of electoral wins. While the elected legislature and political executive might be the only institutional actors to undertake the delimitation of constituencies, adequate space must be provided for contesting ideas, and dissenting opportunities. The path forward includes designing the DC to be an effective fourth-branch institution that balances both political interests and the need for democratic outcomes. The act of delimitation not only affects the design of a democracy but also strikes right at the heart of political representation. Any arbitrary power must be replaced by procedures that are steeped in transparency and consultation.

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This article has been authored by Anshul Dalmia, a Lecturer at Jindal Global Law School, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana. It is part of the RSRR's Excerpts from Experts Series.